Research report · 30 October 2026

Cosmos:
nine chains, zero direct path.

An independent audit of nine Cosmos/CometBFT chains. In the surfaces examined, no permissionless path allows funds to be stolen or tokens to be minted. The most serious issue is bad-debt accounting on Kava (P1), followed by two P2 issues (Akash, Sei) and design risks on Celestia.

9 chains0 direct pathIndependent auditSource + read-only

AFBS-COSMOS-2026-01 · v1.0 · 30 October 2026 · ~6 min read

Summary

This audit covers nine Cosmos/CometBFT chains: Sei, Osmosis, Kava, Akash, Juno, Celestia, Agoric, Dymension and Namada. Sources were pinned to specific commits and verified by blob SHA-1; on-chain checks were read-only. No attack transaction was executed.

In the surfaces examined, no permissionless path allows funds to be stolen or tokens to be minted. This does not mean “Cosmos is safe”: several surfaces are not covered, and the P1/P2 risks below are real. P1/P2 denote non-direct loss or accounting inconsistencies, not permissionless theft paths.

Scope

  • Sei — EVM ↔ Cosmos precompiles, EndBlock, OCC;
  • Osmosis — concentrated liquidity, rounding, rewards;
  • Kava — CDP, hard, earn, auction, swap;
  • Akash — bme, escrow, market;
  • Juno — feeshare, stream, drip, feepay, feemarket and related modules;
  • Celestia — fibre, minfee, blob, zkism;
  • Agoric — ERTP, Zoe, fast-usdc;
  • Dymension — eibc, forward, delayedack;
  • Namada — MASP, nullifier, per-asset value balance.

Key results

ChainResultMain risk
KavaNo direct theftP1 — bad debt is deleted instead of accounted; ghost debt keeps accruing interest, borne by the last depositors.
AkashNo direct theftP2 — escrow payment and accounting are separated; swallowed errors can create a double-payment surface.
SeiNo dual ledgerP2 — EndBlock swallows settlement errors; supply drift is possible.
CelestiaFund flow self-consistentR3/R4 — fibre payer is not bound to the tx signer; Finalize/ReCheck skip signature verification.
OsmosisNo principal lossRewards: forfeited incentives remain in the pool; uptime forfeiture can be bypassed by removing liquidity.
JunoNo direct defect4 Low; revenue-share ownership follows admin (design).
AgoricNo double claimRisk in mint-presence propagation and vat upgrades; vault package absent from this commit.
DymensionNo P0/P1/P2P3 only; eibc signer = payer, no double spend observed in delayedack.
NamadaPer-asset conservationMASP core holds; remaining trust is in the decoding table and governance.

What this report does not prove

“0 direct path” applies only to the surfaces examined. Not covered: Sei’s in-tree SDK and consensus, OCC, most Osmosis modules, Agoric’s SwingSet/vat layer, Namada circuits and conversion, Celestia’s PFF selection/settlement, and several submodules of Kava, Akash, Juno and Dymension.

None of these chains should be described as “fully audited” on the basis of this report.

Method

Sources pinned to specific commits, files fetched by blob and verified by SHA-1. On-chain checks used read-only calls; no attack transaction or local PoC was executed. P1/P2 are loss or accounting inconsistencies, not permissionless direct-theft paths.

Disclosure

The full technical report remains restricted. For teams and partners: security@frblockchain.icu. Do not send private keys, seeds or exploitation secrets.

A multi-chain audit to discuss, a team to meet?