02 / Research

Looking for what breaks,
before it breaks.

Two questions shape our work: where does the randomness that produces your keys come from, and what does your hardware wallet actually emit? Around them, we study protocols, signing interfaces and supply chains — with the same demand for evidence.

Weak randomness Hardware & RF Wallets Coordinated disclosure

Areas of work

Five fields, one same question: where can trust break?

Each area combines documentary review, experimentation and analysis of real-world use.

01

Protocols and contracts

Reentrancy, access control, oracles, upgrade mechanisms, cross-chain bridges: we analyse the invariants that hold a system together, and the assumptions that bring it down.

Solidity / EVMBridgesInvariantsUpgrades
02

Wallets and key lifecycle

From initial entropy to recovery after loss: generation, derivation, storage, backup, signing and succession. We test models — hardware, multisig, MPC, social recovery — against the real threats they face, and we test the quality of the randomness that produces their keys.

RNGBIP-32/39Secure elementsRecovery
03

Signing and interfaces

The moment the user authorises is the most dangerous. EIP-712, abstract accounts, blind signing, persistent approvals, transaction simulation: we study the gap between what is displayed and what is executed.

EIP-712ERC-4337ApprovalsSecurity UX
04

Cryptography and innovation

Zero-knowledge proofs (ZK), fully homomorphic encryption, post-quantum signatures, aggregation: we follow the promises, the trade-offs and the migration paths. A new primitive often moves risk rather than removing it.

ZKFHEPost-quantumAggregation
05

Observation, standards and public policy

Measuring incidents, tracking fixes, comparing practices and contributing to standards. We bring technical evidence to debates on the MiCA regulation, the DORA regulation and the NIS2 directive, without speaking for any commercial actor.

MiCA / DORAThreat intelStandardsOpen data

2027 programmes

Two priorities, one common foundation.

Areas of work, not results. Their timeline and deliverables will be specified after the declaration with the préfecture.

RNG-SCOPE 2027 priority

Hunting weak random number generators

Boot entropy, firmware RNG, seed generation, signing nonces and BIP-32/39 derivation. Statistical tests, code review and reproduction on devices we own or are authorised to test.

Target deliverable · Test report + reproduction scenarios

RF-WALLET 2027 priority

Listening to what the hardware emits

LTE/eSIM, Bluetooth, electromagnetic emissions while a PIN is entered or a seed is displayed, and supply-chain implants. We distinguish a real leak, an artefact and a rumour.

Target deliverable · RF map + exfiltration scenarios

KEY-LIFECYCLE Foundation

Comparing key custody models

Hardware, multisig, MPC, social recovery: a comparative reading of guarantees, dependencies and failure modes, from individuals to institutional treasuries.

Target deliverable · Comparative note

Priorities: RNG-SCOPE and RF-WALLET structure 2027. KEY-LIFECYCLE provides the common framework on key custody.

Fieldwork: reception and analysis of beacon and time-signal stations from several countries, most recently NTSC at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), with complete reports. Independent work, with no partnership or implicit endorsement by the organisations cited.

Latest audit

A critical alert.

The latest report has its own page. The audit archive remains separate from research.

24 October 2026, 18:00 · Critical alert

Komodo / AtomicDEX macOS: critical entropy.

Legacy macOS versions generate recovery phrases with critically weak entropy. Affected wallets must be treated as compromised: BTC wallets were emptied by a third party and a KMD balance remains exposed.

CriticalKMD-ENT-2026-001macOSRNG

Method

Five steps, no shortcuts.

The same discipline applies to a research note, an audit or a disclosure.

01

Scope

Objective, perimeter, versions, rules of engagement and exit criteria, written before starting.

02

Model

Assets, actors, trust boundaries and attack scenarios. What is not modelled remains invisible.

03

Test

Code review, directed tests, fuzzing, dynamic analysis and user interviews.

04

Document

Reproduction, CVSS v4.0 scoring, technical evidence and prioritised recommendations.

05

Share

Coordinated disclosure, publication and verification of fixes. No report left without follow-up.

Policy

Responsible disclosure.

Have you identified a vulnerability in a wallet, a protocol or a tool we study? Write to us. We always put user protection before publication, reputation or spectacle.

No bug bounty at this stage
0–48 h

Acknowledgement of receipt

We confirm receipt and open a private channel with you.

7 days

Assessment

We qualify the report, attempt to reproduce it and identify the people who should be notified.

90 days

Remediation

Target deadline before publication. It may be extended if a credible fix is under way, with written justification.

Publication

Coordination

We publish with the project concerned, or at the end of the deadline, without exposing users to immediate risk.

Publications

The AFBS Cahiers.

Short, dated, reviewed and sourced texts. A single format for technical notes, field analyses and standards proposals.

Propose a topic

AFBS Cahiers / forthcoming

The first Cahier has not been published yet.

We prefer to announce finished work rather than a table of contents. The first issue will appear after the declaration with the préfecture; it will look at the wallet attack surface and the gaps between interface and transaction.

Be told about the first issue

Our acknowledged limit: we do not sell exploits, do not publish before a fix and do not accept embargoes that would protect a reputation rather than people. Security is not a sales argument.

See our approach to audit

A report, an idea, a field to explore? Talk to us.