KMD-ENT-2026-001 · v1.0 · Published 24 October 2026 at 18:00 (Paris time) · ~7 min read
Summary
The report describes a randomness-generation flaw in the macOS branch of Komodo Wallet (formerly AtomicDEX Desktop) across part of its history. The entropy actually used to produce the recovery phrase is far below the security expected from a 256-bit key. The key space can be enumerated offline, and matching addresses can be checked against public blockchain data.
Direct consequence: a wallet created with an affected version must not be “hardened” and reused. Its recovery phrase must be treated as already exposed.
Affected versions
- macOS: 0.1.1-alpha, 0.1.2-alpha, 0.1.3-alpha, 0.1.4-alpha, 0.1.4a, 0.1.5-alpha, 0.2.0-alpha.
- Development builds: 18
cd_release_*branches whose macOS builds use the same weak path. - Fixed version: 0.2.1-alpha (macOS switched to an operating-system randomness source).
- Unverified: 0.8.3–0.9.7 (Flutter versions; seed generation moved into an SDK submodule not audited here). Do not describe them as safe or compromised.
- Windows / Linux: the report did not find the same weak path in the covered versions.
Observed impact
The report documents two real wallets. At least one BTC wallet was later emptied by a third party; the amount is not published, to protect victims. A KMD balance remains on an identified wallet. Addresses, transactions, seeds and technical evidence are not published here.
The risk is not limited to BTC: the same recovery phrase can derive addresses on several chains (LTC, DOGE, DASH, ZEC, KMD, ETH/EVM, etc.). A wallet can be identified and emptied without any interaction with its owner.
Why act immediately
Balances are visible on-chain. Once an address derived from a weak phrase is identified, it can be targeted. Changing the password, PIN or local encryption does not change the recovery phrase and therefore does not fix the exposure.
Action: create a new wallet with a new phrase on a fixed version, then migrate assets on every chain. Never reuse the old phrase, even for a test.
Technical cause (public level)
The report points to a non-cryptographic pseudo-random generator used on the macOS branch, with a low-entropy seed. The 32 bytes produced therefore do not represent 256 bits of security. The exact generation path, evidence and verification scripts remain in the restricted technical report.
Status, limits and disclosure
This page is a public alert. It contains no address, transaction, seed, exploit code or enumeration procedure. The full report is provided to authorised parties under a confidentiality agreement.
The report recommends vendor notification, a CVE request and a coordinated disclosure process. The status of 0.8.3–0.9.7 remains unknown: no general conclusion should be drawn for that range.
Contact
For users, exchanges and the vendor: security@frblockchain.icu. Please state your role and do not send seeds or private keys.